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the U.S. Economy in 1986-88 
William Roberds and Richard M. Todd 
Economists 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
The U.S. economy turned in a mixed performance in 
1986. Inflation fell to its lowest rate in more than 20 
years, but output growth also slowed to a well below-
average pace. A mixed performance was just what had 
been predicted by a forecasting model maintained by 
researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
(Litterman 1985). Unfortunately, that model had pre-
dicted a different mix: rising inflation and above-
average growth. So 1986 was clearly a bad year for the 
model. 
The next two years may be better. To try to correct 
problems that seem to have contributed to its errors in 
1986, we have changed the forecasting model. The new 
and (we hope) improved model predicts that U.S. 
economic performance in 1987-88 will likely be mixed 
again, this time with about average growth but rebound-
ing inflation. 
Growth and Inflation: On the Rebound 
Last year was the fourth year of an economic expansion 
that has passed from a brilliant youth through an 
extended but somewhat disappointing middle age. The 
expansion's next phase, according to our forecasting 
model, is likely to be a reinvigorated old age. Unfortu-
nately, though, its renewed vigor will probably rekindle 
inflation more forcefully than growth. 
1986: A So-So Year in a So-So Expansion 
The vigorous youth of this expansion was in 1983-84, 
when the U.S. economy began to recover from a severe 
recession. In those years, the inflation-adjusted gross 
national product (real GNP) bounced back at a 5.6 
percent annual rate, faster than the 5 percent rate 
typical of the first two years of post-World War II 
expansions. Simultaneously, the inflation rate, as 
measured by changes in the GNP price deflator, fell by 
almost a third to an annual average rate of 3.6 percent. 
The expansion lost much of its vitality in 1985-86. 
On average, both in the postwar period as a whole and 
in the third and fourth years after the beginning of a 
postwar recovery, real GNP expanded at about a 3.2 
percent rate. Recent growth was slower, just 2.9 percent 
in 1985 and 2.2 percent in 1986. However, gains 
against inflation continued. The rate of inflation fell 
from 3.6 percent to 3.3 percent in 1985 and then, in 
1986, to 2.2 percent, the lowest rate since 1964. The 
low 1986 inflation rate reflected oil prices, which 
tumbled when members of the Organization of Petrole-
um Exporting Countries (OPEC) could not agree on 
strict oil production limits. 
The slowdown in growth in 1985-86 has changed 
the image of the current expansion. It no longer looks 
like a pacesetter, for it now ranks fifth among the eight 
postwar expansions in cumulative four-year growth. 
After four full years of growth, however, it has achieved 
longevity. Only two of the other seyen expansions 
lasted as long as four years. And this expansion is 
unique in sustaining both growth and disinflation so 
long. 
7 The economy's performance in 1986 alone may be 
best described as so-so. (See Table 1.) Its good points, 
besides the decline in inflation generally and con-
sumers' energy bills particularly, include falling interest 
rates and a robust stock market; these no doubt helped 
spur the year's healthy growth in residential investment 
and consumer spending, especially spending for durable 
goods like autos. The unemployed portion of the labor 
force also declined a bit in 1986,0.2 percentage point. 
The year's bad points, which helped slow overall 
growth, include deterioration in the nation's trade 
balance and sharp cuts in business investment and 
inventories. The oil price decline contributed to these 
negative developments, too: most of the cuts in the 
business structures component of fixed investment 
were in the domestic energy industry. 
1987-88: Growth and Rising Inflation . .. 
Considering its recent feebleness, can this aging expan-
sion continue through 1987-88? Our model thinks so. 
Based primarily on the historical relationships among 
national economic variables, it forecasts that these next 
two years will likely bring renewed growth—but also 
renewed inflation. The acceleration in growth may be 
modest and temporary while the pickup in inflation 
may be sharper and more sustained. 
The model bases its current forecasts on the values of 
about 50 U.S. economic variables in the 15 months 
ending in February 1987. The forecasts are generated 
by inserting those measures of recent economic perfor-
mance in the model's equations and calculating the 
results. The equations are based on a combination of 
historical evidence about the interactions among eco-
nomic variables and some assumptions about those 
relationships that we have required the equations to 
approximate.
1 
Filtering through the goods and bads of economic 
performance in 1986 and early 1987, the model finds 
evidence that somewhat faster growth lies ahead for the 
U.S. economy. (See Table 1.) After 2.2 percent growth 
in 1986, real GNP is predicted to grow, on average, 
more than 3 percent per year in 1987-88. This should 
be just enough to keep unemployment from changing 
much over that time. Growth is likely to strengthen 
temporarily, however. The model predicts that real 
GNP will grow nearly 4 percent in 1987 and that by the 
fourth quarter the unemployment rate will fall to 6.5 
percent. 
Rebounds in business inventories and fixed invest-
ment account for much of this projected acceleration. 
While most other components of real GNP grow about 
as fast in 1987 as in 1986, the model says, these two 
components will bounce back from big 1986 declines. 
The projected growth in business fixed investment is 
limited to its durable equipment component, which is 
expected to rise 14.8 percent in 1987 after falling 0.6 
percent in 1986. Businesses are also expected to 
moderate their cuts in investment in structures, from 
15.7 percent in 1986 to 7.8 percent in 1987. 
Economic growth is predicted to slip back below 
average in 1988. The model forecasts that real GNP 
will expand closer to 2, rather than 4, percent in that 
year as the unemployment rate climbs back to almost 
7 percent. 
This decline in growth will partly reflect the ending 
of 1987's business investment spurt, the model predicts. 
Business inventory accumulation is expected to slow by 
the end of 1988. At the same time, the model says, 
business investment in structures will likely fall about 9 
percent while the growth in durable equipment invest-
ment slackens to about 8 percent. As a result, total 
business fixed investment would drop back to a near-
normal rate of growth in 1988. 
Slower growth in investment by consumers could 
also restrain growth in 1988. The model projects a 
decline in residential investment and hardly any growth 
in consumer spending for durable goods (which is 
officially counted as consumption but can also be 
considered as investment in long-lasting household 
capital items, such as cars and appliances). 
Continued real GNP growth will be accompanied by 
accelerating inflation in 1987-88, the model says. 
From a low point in 1986, growth in the GNP price 
deflator is projected to nearly double to its postwar 
average rate in 1987 and then rise further in 1988. 
... Maybe 
Of course, economic forecasts are always off at least a 
bit and often by a fair amount. Our model's forecast is 
no exception. This model can make errors for at least 
two basic reasons. One is that the model is not perfect; it 
does not capture all the available information about the 
economy or use the information it does have in the most 
effective way. The other is that some important informa-
tion is simply not available when a forecast must be 
made. This introduces an irreducible element of un-
certainty, or luck, in forecasting, and bad luck can 
produce big errors. 
*For a general discussion of our procedures for combining data and 
assumptions to produce what is known as a Bayesian vector autoregression 
(BVAR) model, see Doan, Litterman, and Sims 1984 and Todd 1984. 
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Table 1 









Annual Growth Rates 
(4th Qtr. % Changes From Year Earlier) 
Real Gross National Product  2.2%  3.8%  2.3%  3.2% 
Consumer Spending  4.0  4.4  2.9  3.4 
Durable Goods  9.9  6.3  .6  4.8 
Nondurable Goods and Services  2.9  4.0  3.4  3.2 
Investment  -2.2  13.7  .9  3.0 
Business Fixed  -5.4  8.4  3.8  3.3 
Residential  9.8  9.2  -1.7  2.8 
Government Purchases  3.3  -2.6  3.2  3.8 
Gross National Product Deflator  2.2  4.1  5.3  4.2 
4th Quarter Levels 
Change in Business Inventories  -11.6 bil.  19.4 bil.  11.2 bil.  — 
(bils. of 1982 $) 
Net Exports (bils. of 1982 S)  -155.5 bil.  -187.9 bil.  -203.4 bil.  — 
(Exports less Imports) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  6.8%  6.5%  6.9%  5.7% 
(Unemployment as a % of the Labor Force) 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
An example of some available information that the 
model may be slighting this year is the federal tax 
reform taking effect in 1987. The model has no tax 
variables, so even though we know about major 
changes in the tax system, we have no simple, direct 
way to force the model to react to them.
2 That does not 
mean, however, that the scheduled tax changes have not 
affected the model's forecast. It means that those 
changes affect the forecast indirectly, through their 
impacts on such model variables as stock prices and 
consumer spending. 
The new tax law is only one example of the special 
factors in the 1987-88 outlook that our model reflects 
somewhat indirectly and, thus, probably somewhat 
inaccurately. The U.S. economy has been experiencing 
a string of fiscal and trade deficits unprecedented in the 
postwar years, possibly making the historical relation-
ships among the model s variables outdated as guides to 
the future. Besides that, in 1985 and 1986 rapid money 
supply growth was combined with moderate and 
declining growth in nominal GNP, which implies the 
sharpest decline in monetary velocity in the postwar 
period—and a lot of uncertainty. If this pattern is 
related to falling interest rates and financial dereg-
ulation, will it persist in 1987 if interest rates stabilize 
and consumers complete their adjustments to the new 
financial environment? Or will the more typical pattern— 
of inflation and growth in nominal GNP running 
2For an example of a direct but not simple way to analyze specific 
economic uncertainties, the possible effects of an oil price shock in 1987, see 
Appendix A. 
9 parallel to monetary growth—reassert itself? The 
model, again, bases its forecasts partly on historical 
patterns and so gives at least some weight to the typical 
result, but is that appropriate? Other unusual uncertain-
ties in the outlook include a possible revival of OPEC 
price-setting in the oil market, the ability of foreign 
debtors to meet their payments, adjustments here and 
abroad to the sharp decline in the U.S. dollar, the 
possibility of rising protectionism worldwide, the resil-
ience of beleaguered sectors of the economy such as 
agriculture and mining, and the ability of consumers to 
meet debt payments and simultaneously expand their 
purchases. 
We should emphasize, however, that uncertainty in 
the economic outlook is normal. Although it may 
sometimes seem to be heightened by special factors, the 
course of the economy is always affected by special 
factors and unanticipated events. Even the best possible 
model—one that optimally used all available informa-
tion—would explain only a portion of the variation in 
the economy over the postwar period; each year bad 
luck would push its forecasts off for one unforeseeable 
reason or another. Models like ours on average make 
even larger errors than that optimal model would. To 
measure the average degree of uncertainty this fact 
creates, our model computes the size of its own typical 
forecasting errors over the postwar period. We then can 
use these to compute the ranges of normal uncertainty 
surrounding the model's current forecast. (Here by 
normal we mean a range of values that, based on the 
model's previous forecasts, has a 70 percent chance of 
including the actual outcome.) These ranges of un-
certainty (or confidence bands) are displayed around the 
model's output and inflation forecasts in Charts 1 and 2. 
They imply that, for example, while real GNP will most 
likely grow at about a 4 percent rate throughout 1987, 
growth rates as great as 9 percent or as small as 1 
percent would not be unusual in any quarter. 
The Model: 
Also on the Rebound? 
The possibility of large forecast errors is, unfortunately, 
not just hypothetical. A forecast of economic perfor-
mance in 1986, made by last year's version of our 
model, turned out to be off target. Furthermore, an 
analysis of its errors suggests that they are not likely due 
just to the kind of unavoidable bad luck that would 
afflict even optimal models. Instead the errors seem to 
be partly the result of systematic flaws in the model. 
Some of the errors, in fact, point to particular flaws and 
suggest changes to correct them. Having made some of 
Charts 1 and 2 
The Model's Hedged View 
of U.S. Output and Inflation in 1987-88 
Predicted Quarterly Percentage Changes at an Annual Rate, 
With 70 Percent Confidence Bands* 
Chart 1 Growth in Real GNP 
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Chart 2 Growth in the GNP Deflator 
'Most likely growth path tor each variable surrounded by a range within which it is likely to fall 
70 percent ot the time, based on 1,000 simulations. 
Source of basic data: U.S. Department of Commerce 
those changes, we think they give the model a better 
chance of hitting the target this year. 
The 1986 Errors: More Than Bad Luck 
Last year the model predicted strong economic growth 
and rising inflation in 1986 (Litterman 1985). It was 
wrong on both counts. Instead of growing the fore-
casted 5.6 percent, real GNP grew only about 2 percent. 
Instead of dropping one full percentage point, the 
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unemployment rate hardly changed. And instead of 
speeding up one full percentage point, the inflation rate 
slowed about that much. Clearly, last year's forecast 
significantly mischaracterized the main qualitative 
features of the economy's performance. 
The errors in last year's forecast were significant 
quantitatively, too, and that suggests that they are due 
to flaws in the model as well as bad luck. According to 
the confidence bands around last year's forecast, the 
model put fairly low probabilities on errors as big as 
those it actually made (Litterman 1985, p. 3). Real GNP 
growth and the unemployment rate were near the edges 
of their confidence bands in 1986, while the deflator 
was below its band. Conceivably, last year's forecast 
still may have been accurate, based on available 
information; the large errors may have just resulted 
from an unlucky combination of unpredictable shocks 
to the economy. But the model itself says, through these 
confidence bands, that bad luck alone does not usually 
produce errors as big as it made in 1986. 
Besides that, many other forecasters managed to 
have much better luck. Of the 50 forecasts reported in 
the December 1985 Blue Chip Economic Indicators, 47 
put 1986 growth slower than the model, and 24 of these 
also put the inflation rate equal to or slower than the 
model. On average, the December 1985 Blue Chip 
panel expected slightly below-average real GNP 
growth and nearly steady unemployment and inflation 
in 19 86—qualitatively, a much better view of what was 
ahead. 
Furthermore, detailed examination of the model's 
GNP forecast errors in 1986 reveals that they were not 
spread throughout the forecast. The model seems to 
have fairly accurately anticipated consumers' behavior, 
the largest contributor to output growth. (See Table 2.) 
Qualitatively, the model was correct. It foresaw that 
consumer spending would grow at an above-average 
rate, would be led by very strong growth in spending on 
durable goods, and would be accompanied by very 
strong growth in residential investment. Quantitatively, 
the model didn't do too badly with consumer behavior, 
either. Slower-than-forecasted growth in spending for 
services and nondurable goods held total consumer 
spending growth to 4 percent, half a percentage point 
below the model's prediction. This overprediction was 
partly offset by the model's underprediction of residen-
tial investment, which grew about 10 percent instead of 
about 8. 
Where the model really missed was in business fixed 
investment, business inventories, and net exports. Al-
together, the model overpredicted these three GNP 
components by about $150 billion.
3 That accounts for 
more than the model's total $125 billion, or 3.4 
percentage point, error in forecasting 1986 growth in 
real GNP. 
The model's most significant error was in business 
fixed investment. This component was expected to 
grow 10.1 percent, more than three times its historical 
average rate of 3.3 percent. Instead it fell sharply, 5.4 
percent. This error, the equivalent of almost $75 billion 
and two percentage points of growth, is due partly to 
unforeseeable factors and partly to factors foreseen in 
late 1985 but not directly incorporated into the model. 
Few people expected the dramatic oil price collapse of 
1986, which severely curtailed oil exploration in the 
United States. That accounts for much of the weakness 
in business fixed investment, especially investment in 
structures like oil rigs. Two other factors—less surpris-
ing to some, but not directly affecting the model's 
forecast—were low capacity utilization rates at U.S. 
manufacturing facilities and signs of weakness (related 
to rising vacancy rates and expected tax law changes) in 
the commercial real estate markets. 
About one percentage point of the model's total error 
was in the forecast of business inventories. The model 
had predicted an inventory accumulation of about $24 
billion in the fourth quarter of 1986. Instead, inven-
tories fell $11.6 billion. The model's error partly 
reflects the fact that inventories, always a volatile, hard-
to-predict component of GNP, were further destabi-
lized by off-again, on-again auto sales incentives. The 
gyrations of auto sales and inventories were particular-
ly severe in the months just before November 1985, 
when the model's 1986 forecast was computed. The 
model had little historical basis for interpreting these 
gyrations and may have been misled by them into a 
prediction of strong inventory accumulation. 
However, this error may also have been related to the 
surprising deterioration in the nation's trade deficit. The 
rate of inventory accumulation lagged the growth of 
sales in 1986. Although this may in part be due to low 
inflation and high real interest rates, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO 1987, p. 35) points out that the 
"downtrend in the inventory-to-sales ratio could also 
have been caused in part by the foreign trade deficit, 
since manufacturers' inventories declined over the year 
even as wholesale and retail trade inventories were 
being built up." 
3For comparability, all the dollar values we mention have been adjusted for 
inflation; they reflect the price level in 1982. 
11 Aside from that possibility, growth in the trade 
deficit was itself a component of the model's 1986 
forecast error. The model projected that the gap 
between exports and imports would shrink about 13 
percent in 1986; instead, it expanded almost 18 percent. 
This error is the equivalent of about 1 percentage point 
of the model's total 3.4 percentage point overprediction 
of growth in 1986. 
Problems in measuring the foreign exchange value 
of the U.S. dollar may have contributed to the trade 
deficit error. The model used the U.S. Commerce 
Department's index of exchange rates, which omits 
many newly industrialized countries. In general, these 
countries are becoming increasingly important to U.S. 
trade, and their currencies have not appreciated as fast 
as those in the Commerce Department index. That 
index, then, may have exaggerated the decline of the 
dollar in 1985, leading the model to expect improve-
ment rather than deterioration in the trade deficit. 
The model's error in the 1986 inflation rate also 
seems to have resulted from both simple surprises and 
potentially correctable measurement problems. The 
biggest surprise, of course, was the sharp decline in 
energy prices. The impact of this decline on inflation 
generally is clear when two measures of consumer 
prices are compared: the standard consumer price index 
(CPI) and the stripped CPI, which omits the prices of 
some particularly volatile items—food consumed at 
home, used cars, and energy. Growth in the standard 
CPI, as in the GNP deflator, slowed significantly in 
1986. Growth in the stripped CPI, however, did not; this 
index rose a bit more than 4 percent in 1986, about as 
much as in the previous two years. This was also almost 
exactly as much as the model had predicted the overall 
GNP deflator to rise. 
Problems in measuring the money supply may have 
contributed to the model's inflation error as well. The 
primary monetary variable in the model was the 
traditional measure of liquid assets, Ml. It consists 
mainly of currency and money in accounts with liberal 
checkwriting privileges. Over most of the postwar 
period, growth in Ml has been roughly proportional to 
subsequent inflation, perhaps because M1 has consisted 
mainly of consumers' easily spendable funds. In the last 
decade, however, financial innovation and deregulation 
have let consumers earn interest on many accounts in 
M1. As a result, M1 accounts are much more attractive 
as investments than they used to be, and consumers are 
holding a larger share of their savings in them. How-
ever, these savings tend to shift in and out of Ml in 
response to changes in the difference between interest 
rates on accounts in and out of M1. This is a new source 
of variability in Ml, one that may cause it to grow 
rapidly sometimes for reasons not closely related to 
subsequent inflation. To the extent this was true in 
1985, the model was misled by its reliance on Ml as a 
measure of money. 
Finally, the model's 1986 inflation error may, like its 
trade deficit error, be due to the problem of measuring 
the dollar's exchange rate. A falling dollar has typically 
been associated with rising import prices and accelerat-
ing inflation. Nonoil import prices did rise in 1986, but 
not as much as the Commerce Department dollar index 
fell. If this index exaggerated the effects of the dollar's 
decline, it helped cause the model's inflation error. 
The Result: A Revised Model. . . 
Errors due to bad luck cannot be avoided—but others 
might be. Much of our model's error in 1986 seems to 
be due to problems with the particular variables it 
includes. That has led to some changes in variables 
which should improve the model's ability to forecast at 
least the major economic indicators—real GNP, un-
employment, and inflation.
4 
The variables in the model are grouped into a core 
sector and seven subsidiary sectors (representing major 
types of economic activity: production, labor, consump-
tion, government, international trade, financial mar-
kets, and prices). (See Litterman 1984, p. 7.) The core 
sector is a self-contained model of those variables 
considered the most important and informative in 
macroeconomic forecasting (measures of things like 
output, inflation, interest rates, and the money supply). 
The other sectors are semi-independent models; they 
each include some variables particular to the sector as 
well as some from the core and, sometimes, from other 
sectors. 
Three variables in the model's core sector have been 
changed since last year's forecast. One variable—total 
nonfinancial debt—has simply been deleted from the 
model. This is because financial deregulation and the 
wave of debt-financed corporate restructurings in re-
cent years seem to have changed the relationships 
between debt and other economic variables. In short, 
the measure of total nonfinancial debt no longer 
conveys useful information about the economy's future 
performance. 
4Other changes have been made in the model as well, particularly changes 
in the technical methods for using the selected variables. This type of change is 
generally prompted more by ongoing research into forecasting methods than by 
any particular forecasting error. For a summary of recent technical changes, see 
Appendix B. 
12 William Roberds, Richard M. Todd 
Forecasting and Modeling 
Another core variable—the foreign exchange value 
of the U.S. dollar—has been revised. The old measure of 
this variable—again, the Commerce Department's dol-
lar index—is based on a set of weights that reflect world 
trade patterns among the large developed economies in 
1972-76. Because this index gives no weight to the 
currencies of many countries of growing importance to 
U.S. trade (Korea and Taiwan, for example), it now 
seems too narrowly based to accurately measure the 
impact of recent (and future) changes in the dollar's 
value. By focusing much of its weight on Germany and 
Japan, that is, the index may have exaggerated the 
decline of the dollar since 1985 and so caused the 
model to overpredict inflation and underpredict the 
trade deficit. 
Although several broader indexes have been pro-
posed as better measures of the dollar's foreign ex-
change value, the most convenient for us is the Dallas 
Federal Reserve Bank's index (not adjusted for inflation 
in the covered countries). (See Cox 1986.) This series is 
available monthly back to January 1976. We are 
keeping the Commerce Department series for earlier 
years, when U.S. trade was more concentrated among 
the countries it covers. 
So far the change in the exchange rate variable is 
most evident in the model's forecasts for inflation: they 
are markedly lower with the Dallas index than with the 
Commerce index. The change has also modestly af-
fected the model's import and export equations, result-
ing in slightly larger trade deficit forecasts. 
A third change in the core sector is the substitution of 
the monetary base for M1 as the model's money supply 
variable. The monetary base consists mainly of curren-
cy and the reserves of depository institutions; unlike 
Ml, it does not include funds in accounts with liberal 
checkwriting privileges. Ml has not been discarded, 
however; it is now a subsidiary variable predicted by an 
equation in the model's financial sector, as the mone-
tary base used to be. In addition, the measure of the 
monetary base in the model has been changed from a 
series maintained by the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank to one maintained by the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors.
5 The reversal in the positions of Ml and 
the monetary base in the model is supported by recent 
evidence that the base's relationship to the economy has 
been more stable than Mi's (Christiano 1986). This 
change seems to have reduced the model's forecasts of 
both inflation and growth from what they would have 
been with the old model. 
One variable not in the model's core sector has been 
changed as well. The inventories of durable goods 
variable in the production sector is now divided into 
auto and nonauto components. This lets us use more 
directly the monthly and even more frequently availa-
ble data on auto sales and inventories. It also lets us see 
more directly the effects on the model of typical—or 
unusual—volatility in auto sales and inventories. 
... And Better Forecasts? 
Though still far from perfect, the revised forecasting 
model is probably better than its predecessor. At least, 
the changes made to the model seem sensible: Treating 
auto inventories separately and revising the measures 
of money and the dollar's foreign exchange value would 
seem to help produce equations that represent stable 
and reliable relationships among economic variables. 
Confidence in the revised model is strengthened by 
its apparent better ability to predict real GNP, unemploy-
ment, and inflation. To test this, we estimated the 
relationships among the new model's variables through 
October 1985, just before the old model forecasted 
1986; in effect, that is, we gave the new model all the 
information the old model could have had for that 
forecast. We then asked this version of the new model to 
predict 1986. The results, shown in Table 2, indicate 
that the revised model would have come closer to the 
actual values of the aggregate measures of economic 
activity. The real GNP forecast would have been only 
slightly better, but the model's errors in forecasting 
unemployment and inflation would have been cut in 
half. 
The revised model also looks better in relation to 
other forecasters: in general its 1987 forecast is more in 
the mainstream than the old model's 1986 forecast was. 
Both the current and the previous forecasts of inflation 
one year ahead match the average of the dozens of 
contemporaneous forecasts published in the Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators (Blue Chip 1987b, 1985). How-
ever, the previous forecast of the unemployment rate 
one year ahead was 0.7 percentage point below the Blue 
Chip average, and only one Blue Chip panelist fore-
casted a rate that low. The previous real GNP growth 
forecast was 1.6 percentage points above the Blue Chip 
average and was matched or exceeded by only three 
panelists. The model's current forecasts of these two 
variables are much less atypical. The unemployment 
rate prediction for 1987 is only 0.3 percentage point 
below the Blue Chip average and equals or exceeds the 
5We start with the Board's raw series, unadjusted for either seasonal 
fluctuations or reserve requirement changes. We deseasonalize that series as 
described in Amirizadeh 1985, but do not adjust for reserve requirements. 
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4th Quarter Level 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 
(Unemployment as a % of the Labor Force) 
6.0  6.8  6.4 
Components  Annual Growth Rates 
(4th Qtr. % Changes From Year Earlier) 
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Government Purchases  1.9  3.3  -5.0 
4th Quarter Levels 
(bils. Of 1982 $) 
Change in Business Inventories  24.4 bil.  -11.6 bil.  31.0 bil. 
Net Exports (Exports less Imports)  -115.1  -155.5  -166.1 
'Based on revised data (available October 1985) and model. 
Sources: Litterman 1985, U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
rates predicted by more than a dozen panelists. Similar-
ly, the current real GNP growth forecast is only 0.7 
percentage point above the Blue Chip average and is 
matched or exceeded by the forecasts of an even dozen 
panelists. 
Of course, closely matching other published fore-
casts does not necessarily make our model's current 
forecast accurate. Last year, in fact, most other forecast-
ers were also wrong. Besides that, one distinctive 
feature of our model's forecast is its independence of 
the human guesswork often built into other forecasts. 
However, in recent years the historical relationships 
among economic variables that our model relies on 
appear to be changing more rapidly than ever before in 
the postwar period. This has required changes in the 
model's equations to try to objectively capture the new 
relationships, a process that many other forecasters 
supplement with subjective modification of the model's 
forecasts. To the extent that their subjective forecast 
adjustments do take account of the new relationships, 
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our closer correspondence to their forecasts suggests 
that our model is capturing some of the new relation-
ships, too. 
We are well aware, however, that both our model 
and its current forecasts are far from optimal. We have 
had neither the insight nor the time to devise and test 
solutions for all of the problems suggested by the 
model's recent forecasting errors. Even the changes we 
have made should be viewed as provisional efforts in an 
ongoing research program. More efforts may be needed 
to improve the model's performance with regard to 
some of the individual components of real GNP. Table 
2 shows that, notwithstanding its more accurate 1986 
forecast of aggregate GNP, the new model would have 
had even larger errors than the old model in predicting 
many of its components. 
Furthermore, the new model's 1987 forecasts of 
these components contradict the patterns expected by a 
majority of the Blue Chip panelists this year (Blue Chip 
1987a, p. 8). The panelists say that the most favorable 
influence on economic growth in 1987 will be a 
"sharply lower dollar," which will "diminish [the] trade 
deficit." The model predicts instead that the trade 
deficit will widen significantly in 1987. The model finds 
strength not in trade, but in a boomlet in investment and 
continued expansion of consumption. Again, the Blue 
Chip panel disagrees, citing as the two least favorable 
influences on growth in 1987 the "negative effects of 
tax reform," which "reduces investment incentives," 
and "excessively high" consumer debt, which dampens 
growth in consumption. 
In Conclusion: A Defense 
of Model-Based Forecasting 
So, our model made significant errors in forecasting 
1986, its defects have not all been corrected, and its 
1987-88 forecasts, especially of GNP components, 
could easily turn out to be way off. Nonetheless, we 
think that these forecasts deserve consideration and 
that our forecasting procedure—presenting the un-
touched predictions of an explicit, self-contained statis-
tical model involving the interrelationships of many 
variables—is worthy of further research. 
Explicit, self-contained forecasting models can pro-
vide useful information that is rarely available from 
other forecasting procedures. An explicit model is one 
completely written down in a mathematically precise 
form, such as a computer program. Writing down such 
a model makes all the assumptions and knowledge built 
into the model unambiguous, so that they can be 
criticized and improved on by anyone. This alone is an 
advantage. But if a model is also self-contained— 
capable of forecasting all of its variables internally, 
without human tinkering—then it has two further 
advantages. It can generate meaningful and internally 
consistent measures of the uncertainty surrounding its 
forecasts. (See Todd 1984 and Litterman and Supel 
1983 for more on this.) And it can provide an indepen-
dent, unique perspective on the economy's future, one 
relatively free of the presumptions and biases that often 
influence human forecasters. 
One way to build an explicit, self-contained model is 
to predict each variable by an equation based just on the 
variable's own past values. We use such univariate 
models to set a standard of accuracy. We then try to 
meet that standard while also capturing the predictable 
linkages among economic variables in a multivariate 
model. Since economic theory suggests that economic 
variables are highly interactive, the forecasts of a good 
multivariate model should, in principle, be better than 
those of a bunch of univariate models of the same 
variables. (Admittedly, constructing a good multivari-
ate model is, in practice, difficult. Our procedure is 
described in Doan, Litterman, and Sims 1984 and Todd 
1984.) Multivariate models have one other advantage. 
They can answer at least some kinds of questions about 
the effects that movements in one economic variable 
will have on other economic variables. This is obviously 
impossible with a univariate model. 
The particular type of explicit, self-contained, multi-
variate model that we work with—the so-called 
Bayesian vector autoregression, or BVAR, model— 
shows special promise. The forecasting track record of 
such models is respectable despite the errors in 1986. 
From early 1980 to early 1985, for example, a set of 
BVAR models maintained by Litterman (1986) pre-
dicted U.S. real GNP and unemployment one year 
ahead at least as well as some of the nation's leading 
forecasting firms. Furthermore, extensive testing of 
several BVAR models indicates that this type of model 
forecasts about as accurately as, and often more 
accurately than, the best univariate models. Few other 
multivariate approaches have documented this degree 
of accuracy. Finally, BVAR models are likely to 
continue to improve—and not just because they are 
explicit models open to future criticism. Many excellent 
ideas for refining them are already being tested. 
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Simulating an Oil Price Shock 
From time to time in the past 20 years, sharp changes in crude 
oil prices have seemed to have a major impact on the 
aggregate U.S. economy. (See, for example, Hamilton 1983.) 
While some impact might be expected based on conceptual 
grounds, the size of the impact is still an open empirical issue. 
Simulations with the national forecasting model maintained 
by researchers at the Minneapolis Fed suggest that the impact 
has shrunk over time, so that oil price changes can be 
expected to affect the U.S. economy less today than they did in 
the 1970s. 
A Source of Uncertainty 
The technological importance of oil to this economy is 
difficult to overstate. Petroleum products are its largest single 
source of energy; in 1985, for example, after years of high oil 
prices and efforts at oil conservation, oil still accounted for 
about 42 percent of the energy consumed in the United States. 
Chart A1 
The Average Price of Oil Imported to the United States 
Monthly, 1965-86 
$ per barrel 








Actual (Current $) 
nL I 1 I 1 I I 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 I L_J 1 1 I I i L 
u 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Note: The shaded areas are, roughly, periods of oil price shocks. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
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Obviously, then, sudden large changes (or shocks) in the price 
of oil could have strong negative effects on the course of the 
economy. A sharp rise in this price would, in the short run, 
increase the real costs of most industries and reduce the real 
incomes of most consumers, which would in turn reduce 
overall growth. In the longer run, these effects may be at least 
partially offset by capital investment in conservation and 
alternative energy sources (insulated houses, fuel-efficient 
airplanes, and coal-fired power plants, for example)—but that 
can take years. In the meantime, the depressing effects of an 
oil price rise would likely persist. A sudden fall in the price of 
oil, while beneficial to consumers, also could have serious 
negative effects on growth. This has been clear in the last two 
years, as rapid declines in oil prices have dramatically 
curtailed U.S. oil exploration and production and generally 
slowed the growth of regional economies closely tied to the oil 
industry. 
Historically, the negative effects of sudden changes in the 
price of oil have probably been exacerbated by the fact that 
such changes have been unexpected. As Chart A1 shows, over 
most of the past 20 years, crude oil prices have moved neither 
smoothly nor predictably. Instead, they have moved dramat-
ically at least three times—after the 1973 oil embargo, the 
1979 revolution in Iran, and the 1985 collapse of the OPEC 
pricing structure. And since 1973, they have been fluctuating 
much more between dramatic events, too. 
All of this makes forecasting oil prices a highly uncertain 
activity for anyone. It is especially difficult for our national 
forecasting model because the price of oil is determined by 
international factors largely outside its scope. In fact, this 
price is not one of the variables the model routinely tracks. 
However, because the model does provide a summary of the 
responses of its variables to random shocks, it can also 
provide some rough idea of the effects of an oil price shock, or 
a sequence of shocks, on the national economy. This can be 
done by associating unexpected changes in the model's 
variables with unexpected changes in the price of oil. 
Defining an Oil Price Shock 
As Sims (1986) points out, any attempt at calculating the 
effects of any shock necessarily involves some identifying, or 
defining, assumptions that make the notion of the particular 
shock precise. Although these assumptions can be formalized 
in several ways, they are all cumbersome for models as large 
as ours. Instead of using these methods, therefore, we have 
simply looked at changes in closely related variables of the William Roberds, Richard M. Todd 
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Behind the Simulation of an Oil Price Shock 
Table A1 
Changes Accompanying a Sudden 30% 
Oil Price Increase 
Model Variables Changes* 
Price Sector 
Index of Spot Market Prices for Raw Industrials 4.3% 
Energy Component of the Consumer Price Index 3.6 
Producer Price Index 1.7 
Price Deflator of the Gross National Product .5 
Export/Import Price Ratio -3.1 
Financial Markets Sector 
10-Year U.S. Government Bond Rate 23 basi? 
points 
3-Month U.S. Treasury Bill Rate 20 
Federal Funds Rate 17 
Standard & Poor's 500 Common Stock Price Index -2.1% 
'Average changes in oil price-related variables during months in 1965-85 in which the average 
price of oil imported to the U.S. changed more than 10%. 
Sources: U.S. Departments of Labor and Commerce, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
Standard & Poor's Corporation 
Chart A2 
A Sequence of Monthly Oil Price Increases 
Percentage Changes in the Price of Oil Imported to the U.S. 
After the 1973 Oil Embargo 
109.5 
Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Total 
1973 1974 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
model during periods when the oil price changed drastically— 
specifically, changes in some price indices and financial 
market variables during the months of 1965-85 in which the 
average price of oil imports moved more than 10 percent. 
After correcting for the sign of the oil price changes, we 
averaged the related changes to produce a definition of an oil 
price shock. Our definition implies that an unexpected 
extremely large (30 percent) increase in the price of oil would 
be accompanied by the changes in price and financial market 
variables displayed in Table Al. 
Of course, this definition of an oil price shock assumes that 
a sudden change in the price of oil affects the economy 
initially only through relative prices and financial market 
variables* Real quantities, such as the gross national product 
(GNP), are assumed to be affected only with a lag, as the 
effects of changes in prices and interest rates work their way 
through the economy. 
One way to simulate an oil price shock in our model is to 
simply apply the changes of Table A1 to the first month of our 
forecast. However, historically oil price shocks have not been 
limited to just one month, and cumulatively they have 
involved an oil price increase greater than 30 percent. So we 
instead apply a sequence of monthly shocks that about 
matches a sequence the economy actually experienced, 
during late 1973 and early 1974, after the oil embargo. Over 
that period, the average price of imported oil increased a total 
of 109.5 percent, through a sequence of monthly increases, 
shown in Chart A2. For our simulation, we assume that oil 
prices follow this sequence exactly, but starting in April 1987. 
We adjust the changes in the model variables that accompa-
nied the 30 percent one-time oil price increase (Table A1) to 
reflect instead the oil price increase in each individual month 
of the sequence. This adjusted series of changes is then 
applied to the model. 
Surprising Effects ... 
The results of this simulation are somewhat surprising. (See 
Table A2 and Charts A3-A5.) Qualitatively, the model's 
predictions are exactly what one would expect in the face of 
rapidly escalating oil prices: falling production accompanied 
by rising inflation and unemployment. But quantitatively, 
some of the effects are quite small. For real output growth, 
hardly any effect is predicted in 1987 and less than a 
percentage point loss in 1988. By contrast, the annual growth 
rate of real GNP fell more than 5 percentage points between 
1973 and 1974 (from 5.1 percent to-0.5 percent). The effect 
of the oil price shock on the unemployment rate is relatively 
small, too, but closer to the 1973-74 experience. The model 
predicts virtually no effect in 1987 and a rise of only 
0.7 percentage point in 1988—the same amount the unem-
ployment rate increased between 1973 and 1974. 
* A sudden change in the price of oil is also likely to have a big impact on the 
foreign exchange value of the dollar. Due to recent measurement problems with 
this variable, however, we have excluded it from this experiment. 
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The Projected Annual Effects of an Oil Price Shock 
1987  1988  % Point Difference 
(Due to Shock) 









% Point Difference 
(Due to Shock) 
1987 1988 
















Unemployment as a % 
of the Labor Force  6.60  6.65  6.67  7.38  + .05  + .71 
*Note that these projections are in terms of annual averages rather than fourth quarter levels, so they do not match those in the preceding paper. 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
In striking contrast to these real series, the predicted effect 
of the oil price shock on inflation is immediate and quite large. 
The model says growth in the GNP deflator would be 
increased 1.3 percentage points in 1987 and 2.1 percentage 
points in 1988. These increases are very close to the 1.8 and 
2.2 percentage point increases experienced in 1973 and 1974. 
... But Reasonable 
So, on the whole, the model's simulation of an oil price shock 
suggests that while such a shock would probably produce 
sharp increases in the inflation rate, its real output effects 
would likely be much smaller than those experienced during 
the 1973-74 oil crisis. While at first glance this result may 
seem curious, it makes sense from both a historical and an 
economic point of view. 
Chart A4 demonstrates that the model does not expect the 
oil price shock to permanently affect inflation. Instead, it 
expects the inflation rate to rapidly return to what it would 
have been without the shock. This predicted tendency for a 
rapid surge in inflation to be quickly reversed probably 
reflects a similar tendency in the historical path of inflation 
(and oil prices) during the late 1970s and 1980s. The 
experience of the last two years also suggests that the model's 
projection of only slightly reduced growth after an oil price 
shock is reasonable. The average price of oil fell about 60 
percent between 1984 and 1986, yet real GNP growth over 
that period averaged an annual rate of only about 2.5 percent. 
These figures do not suggest that a doubling of oil prices 
would likely have the same effect on the economy as it did in 
1973-74. They instead suggest that economic growth in the 
United States has become less sensitive to world oil price 
changes. Since apparently only a very small pickup in 
economic growth has been associated with such a large drop 
in oil prices, a large reduction in growth would not likely be 
associated with a price rise of roughly that size. 
There are several reasons why the impact of an oil price 
shock on economic growth might be smaller today than in 
1973-74. One is that the recovery of the economy from the 
1973-74 shock was hampered by some poorly conceived 
policy actions that have since been either dismantled or 
substantially modified (MacAvoy 1983). Among these are 
price controls on domestic oil supplies that encouraged 
domestic consumption yet discouraged domestic production; 
an entitlements program that encouraged crude oil importa-
tion; and stringent controls on domestic supplies of natural 
gas that discouraged substitution of natural gas for oil. More 
important, the higher oil prices since the late 1970s have 
resulted in widespread substitution of funds from consump-
tion of oil to investment in energy-saving capital (things like 
electronic thermostats and assembly lines for manufacturing 
compact cars). Since this capital depreciates only slowly, most 
of it is still in place today and available to reduce oil demand 
when the price of oil is high. 
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Charts A3-A5 
The Projected Monthly Effects of an Oil Price Shock 
Actual and Projected Without a Shock 
Projected With a Shock 
Chart A3 Real GNP Growth 
(Monthly Changes at an Annual Rate) 
Chart A4 GNP Deflator Growth 
(Monthly Changes at an Annual Rate) 
Chart A5 Unemployment as a % of 
the Labor Force (Monthly Levels) 
% 
-
n i  i  i r 
1986 1987 1988 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
Appendix B 
Technical Changes in the Forecasting Model 
The Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) methods used to 
construct the national models maintained by Minneapolis Fed 
researchers have been summarized by Doan, Litterman, and 
Sims (1984) and Todd (1984). The main features of the model 
used to make last year's forecast have also been summarized, 
by Litterman (1984) and Amirizadeh (1985). Since that 
forecast was published, the model has been revised in 
response to its systematic pattern of forecast errors. Besides 
the changes in the model's variables, discussed in the 
preceding paper, some more technical changes have been 
made. These are partly motivated by the model's errors, but 
primarily by ongoing research on BVAR models. 
Hyperparameters 
One change has been to reduce the number of Bayesian 
hyperparameters in the model. Previously, each of the model's 
eight sectors, including the core, had its own independently 
selected set of hyperparameters. Now the model has just one 
basic set of hyperparameters for all sectors. This smaller 
number of independent hyperparameters can more reliably be 
chosen by the amount of postwar data available. 
Two of the model's sectors—price and production—have a 
special modification of the basic set of hyperparameters. This 
is because out-of-sample forecasting experiments indicate 
that these sectors will not forecast as well if all the hyperpa-
rameter values that are optimal for the other sectors are 
imposed on them. 
The price sector differs from the other sectors primarily in 
how the sum-of-coefficients restriction is imposed on its 
equations. This restriction takes the form Zk>0aijk= 8y + Vy, 
where aijk is the coefficient on the A:th lag of variable j in 
equation i, 8y = 1 if i=j and 0 otherwise, and v,-,- is a mean zero 
normal random variable. That is, sums of coefficients are 
about one on own lags and about zero on other lags. 
Previously, the weight on this approximate prior restriction 
was the same for all variables. In our modification, the weight 
on this restriction is reduced for all variables in the model's 
price sector and the producer price index in its production 
sector. 
This modification was motivated by the results of Miller 
and Roberds (forthcoming), who got better forecasts when 
they loosened the sum-of-coefficients constraints on nominal 
variables. In our model, the modification produces less 
explosive forecasts of the price variables. 
Estimation, Interpolation, and Uncertainty 
Changes in the hyperparameters have necessarily led to other 
changes in the model. Since hyperparameters influence how 
19 the historical data are converted into estimates of the model's 
coefficients, those coefficients have been changed, too. Also 
affected are the weights used to impose the model's adding-up 
constraints for the forecasted components of the output and 
inflation variables. 
Changes have been made as well in the way the model uses 
monthly and submonthly data related to its variables. In both 
the old and the new models, such data are used to interpolate 
the monthly values of variables only officially measured 
quarterly. Many small refinements to these interpolation 
equations have been made over the past year. 
One change has also been made in how the model 
computes confidence bands for its forecasts. In both the old 
and the new models, the most recently estimated coefficients 
are held constant in performing these simulations; the only 
random influences are the disturbance vectors added to the 
model's equations. These used to be drawn from a mean zero 
normal distribution with a covariance matrix estimated from 
the model's fitted residuals since January 1962. Now they are 
drawn, randomly and with replacement, from a collection of 
the model's one-step-ahead forecast error vectors over that 
period. The new procedure improves on the old in two ways. 
Though it still underestimates uncertainty by treating the 
model's coefficients as known, it partially compensates by 
computing wider variances (by basing them on one-step-
ahead forecast errors rather than fitted residuals). And it 
allows for nonnormality in the model's disturbances, which is 
appropriate because the incidence of extreme equation errors 
is higher for this model than a normal distribution would 
predict. 
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